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Can We Say No?
Frank Pasquale1
Abstract
Normative analysis of cognition-enhancing drugs frequently weighs the liberty interests of drug users against egalitarian values. 
Yet those who would refuse to engage in neuroenhancement may well find their liberty to do so limited in a society where 
such drugs are widespread. To the extent that unvarnished emotional responses are world-disclosive, neurocosmetics also 
threaten to foist faulty data upon all their users. This essay examines underappreciated liberty-based and epistemic rationales 
for regulating cognition-enhancing drugs.
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New pharmaceutical technology challenges extant philo-
sophical accounts of autonomy and liberty. The classic divide 
between positive and negative liberty1 will seem increasingly 
outmoded as new competitive environments create dire con-
sequences for many of those who fail to normalize behavior 
and affect in line with ever-more precise neurocosmetic inter-
ventions. Paradoxes of precommitment will also develop. If a 
person at one point in time commits himself to taking a drug 
that both creates certain patterns of behavior and affect, and 
generates a need to keep taking that drug, can the continuing 
use of the drug be said to be autonomous?
We are used to distinguishing between addiction, mere 
habit, and virtuous commitment by examining the psychic 
state of the subject and the effect of the subject’s use of sub-
stances on her or his participation in society. Frequent cocaine 
use tends to wreck a person’s career and family life. A habit 
of exercising may jokingly be called an “addiction,” but is 
usually admired for its contribution to health and well-being. 
As large pharmaceutical firms tailor neurocosmetics to gen-
erate both feelings of well-being and efficient attention to 
work, the old methods of distinguishing harmful addictions 
from virtuous habits will break down. If there is a problem 
with such drugs, it must be distinguished from the “drug 
problem” so familiar in U.S. political discourse.
Once utilitarian analysis of the effects of drug use is set 
to one side, other concerns about neurocosmetics emerge. In 
previous work, I have pursued a sociological critique, focus-
ing on the competitive pressures that render the decision to 
take neurocosmetics a far from free choice.2 This essay focuses 
on epistemological dimensions of advanced neurocosmetic 
use, characterizing them as emotional “blinders” designed to 
deny the world-disclosive dimensions of normal emotional 
life. The first section focuses on current trends in psycho-
pharmacology. The second section queries whether advanced 
neurocosmetics are compatible with traditional understandings 
of autonomy. The piece provisionally concludes that overem-
phasis on autonomy as Dennettian “elbow room” to have “done 
otherwise” has obscured the epistemological foundations 
of truly free choice. To the extent advanced neurocosmetics 
block recognition of difficult truths or feelings, they under-
mine the very foundations of autonomy.
Pharmaceutical Heteronomy
What happens when pharmaceutical technology grants us 
the freedom to consider ourselves heteronomous? A recent 
book on health care rationing in the United States (Can We 
Say No?) worries that political pressures for health spending 
will ultimately bankrupt the U.S. economy. This idea of 
a spending ratchet is a commonplace of the health care 
finance literature. Less well covered has been a creep toward 
performance-enhancing drugs. Though less of a threat to the 
public till, they raise fundamental questions about individuals’ 
capacity for autonomous reactions to technological trends.
Consider a recent discussion in Edge, an online magazine 
that asked 151 luminaries “What Will Change Everything?” 
Marcel Kinsborne predicted a growing market for “neuro-
cosmetics” that translate the benefits of cosmetic surgery to 
the social world:
[D]eep brain stimulation will be used to modify person-
ality so as to optimize professional and social opportunity, 
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within my lifetime. Consider an arms race in affability, a 
competition based not on concealing real feelings, but on 
feelings engineered to be real. . . . [Or] switching a per-
sonality on and then off, when it becomes boring?
We take ourselves to be durable minds in stable 
bodies. But this reassuring self-concept will turn out to 
be yet another of our so human egocentric delusions. 
Do we, strictly speaking, own stable identities? When 
it sinks in that the continuity of our experience of the 
world and our self is at the whim of an electrical cur-
rent, then our fantasies of permanence will have 
yielded to the reality of our fragile and ephemeral 
identities.3
It is one thing to read these imaginings in the fiction of a 
Houllebecq, Franzen, or Foster Wallace; it is quite another 
to see them predicted by a professor of psychology at the 
New School for Social Research. The arms race Kinsborne 
describes is likelier to erode, rather than reveal, humanity’s 
true nature.4 His complacency at this prospect reveals a 
technophilic bias at the heart of Edge’s inquiry: an implicit 
belief that certain technologies will inevitably change us 
rather than being changed or stopped by us.
Assumptions about the plasticity of the self—and 
concomitant inevitability of technology—are driving the 
acceptance of new technologies of self-alteration. Helen 
Fisher, a biological anthropologist and chief scientific advi-
sor for the online dating site Chemistry.com, openly embraces 
an arms race metaphor as she predicts, in the same Edge 
symposium, that “ever more of us will begin to use [a] new 
arsenal of weapons to manipulate ourselves and others.” In a 
recent editorial in Nature titled “Towards Responsible Use 
Of Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs By The Healthy,”5 distin-
guished contributors have endorsed a “presumption that 
mentally competent adults should be able to engage in cogni-
tive enhancement using drugs.” The editorialists argue that 
cognitive enhancement is here to stay: “From assembly line 
workers to surgeons, many different kinds of employee may 
benefit from enhancement and want access to it, yet they 
may also need protection from the pressure to enhance.”6 
Despite repeated failures of self-regulatory professional 
standards in drug prescribing in the past,7 the Nature editori-
alists assume that doctors will suddenly be up to this delicate 
task in the future.
As humans become more machine-like and machines 
become more like humans,8 the assumption that normal emo-
tions are something to be “fixed” or “corrected” is sure to 
gain currency. At the vanguard of this approach are Patricia 
and Paul Churchland, who, rather than acting out, express-
ing, or displaying emotions,9 appear to prefer to refer to their 
supposed chemical determinants:
One afternoon recently, Paul says, he was home 
making dinner when Pat burst in the door, having 
come straight from a frustrating faculty meeting. She 
said, “Paul, don’t speak to me, my serotonin levels 
have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids, 
my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it 
weren’t for my endogenous opiates I’d have driven the 
car into a tree on the way home. My dopamine levels 
need lifting. Pour me a Chardonnay, and I’ll be down 
in a minute.10
Fisher, Kinsborne, and the Churchlands suggest the meta-
physical foundations of self-mechanization. It’s a vision of 
the self as “multiple input-multiple output transducer,” which 
accepts and extends a long intellectual tradition of reducing 
“soul to self, self to mind, and mind to brain.”11 This last 
step of understanding what the brain is as what it does is a 
functionalism that begs the question Bourne used to put to 
Dewey: what exactly is the point of this pragmatic deflation 
of our self-understanding?12
In an increasingly market-oriented society, cost control is 
often a key rationale for product success. For example, the 
Wall Street Journal reports that “Nearly 30% of the total 
nursing-home population is receiving antipsychotic drugs. . . . 
In a practice known as ‘off label’ use of prescription drugs, 
patients can get these powerful medicines whether they are 
psychotic or not.”13 Drugged patients can be far cheaper to 
care for than those who are fully aware of their plight. Some 
businesses and schools are also pushing for more pliant 
employees and students, expanding the range of what is clas-
sified as “mental illness” in order to enhance docility.14 As 
Frederick Crews has observed, there is increasing pressure to 
conform one’s personality to a sanguine norm.15
Many recent books are questioning the expansive trend 
toward “medicalizing” emotional responses that were once 
considered acceptable.16 Horwitz and Wakefield argue that 
“instances of what Freud called ‘ordinary human misery’ 
should not be confused with real mental disorder”—but there 
are many pressures toward treating them as such. As the 
realm of “mental optimization” expands, more employers 
will request (or demand) employees take certain drugs. For 
example, someone grieved by a loss might become much 




Generators of Faulty Data
As advanced neurocosmetics become more common in the 
workplace, the complex emotional mixture of ennui, detach-
ment, skepticism, and embers of warmth in office life limned 
in a novel like Joshua Ferris’s And Then We Came to the 
End18 could be flattened into the glad-handing grins of “com-
pany men.” The neurocosmetics forecast in Edge have the 
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same place in the social world that marketing has in the 
worlds of goods and services. Such drugs promote a shift in 
their users from being an object to being a subject of market-
ing. As Rob Horning has suggested, “consumerism makes 
the will and ability to concentrate seem a detriment to our-
selves.”19 Similarly, neurocosmetics promises to relieve the 
mental effort of crafting a genuinely integrated response to 
events from the welter of conflicting emotions they generate, 
leaving only the feeling induced by drugs.
In a world of advanced neurocosmetics, emotions lose 
their world-disclosive20 potential and moral force. Rather 
than guiding our choices, emotions are themselves among the 
many “experiences” an individual can “consume.” The 
industrial possibilities are endless; some rigorous cost-
benefit analyses may prove a new soma’s indispensability to 
such varied crises as demographic imbalances21 and mass 
unemployment.22
What kind of common moral language is necessary to a 
reconsideration of neurocosmetics? Philosophers Langdon 
Winner and Albert Borgmann have started answering that 
question as they consider technology’s impact on the charac-
ter of contemporary life.23 Borgmann notes that “simulations 
of reality can lead to disastrous decisions when assumptions 
or data are faulty.”24 Perhaps we should start thinking of 
neurocosmetics as a faulty source of data about emotional 
responses to the world around us. As Martha Nussbaum has 
demonstrated in her work Upheavals of Thought, emotional 
responses blend cognitive and affective reactions in a way 
that is essential to responsible moral evaluation. For exam-
ple, in all but the most extreme cases of trauma, a physician 
who gave a patient a pill to make her forget the death of her 
father a day before would rightly be viewed as deeply irre-
sponsible. Far from being an annoyance or impediment, the 
grief is essential to the identity of the griever.
Concluding Reflections: 
Questions of Degree
Admittedly, the precise gradations between normal and path-
ological grief are difficult to draw. As Peter Kramer noted in 
his book Listening to Prozac, some cultures require widows 
to mourn publicly for five years after a husband’s death; 
others value more rapid resilience. It is difficult to say, as a 
general matter, which is the “best” response, and technology 
may be a useful tool for some in oppressive societies to escape 
from the worst aspects of their cultural heritage.25
Yet technological pressures to engage in certain modes of 
behavior and affect, simply in order to enhance efficiency, 
deserve deeper consideration. As Dr. Anjan Chatterjee, a neu-
rologist at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital, has 
observed, pharmaceutical self-control could transform auton-
omous humans into “automatons that are very good at 
implementing things but have nothing to implement.”26
A movement from autonomy to automata-dom is not on 
the agenda of any current innovators in psychopharmacol-
ogy. Nevertheless, one of the great lessons of the philosophy 
of technology is the slow transformation of “optional” tech-
nologies into mandatory accoutrements of daily life. The 
“free choice” to take a mood-enhancing drug can quickly 
morph into a de facto requirement of market competition. 
For example, many students now feel that they must take 
attention-enhancing drugs in order to adequately compete in 
final examinations. Before celebrating drugs’ capacity to 
remake ourselves, the advocates of advanced neurocos-
metics need to articulate more seriously precisely what the 
endpoint of their project is.
Only a few legal scholars have begun to examine the 
institutional mechanisms needed to bring about such a 
public articulation and examination of pharmaceutical inno-
vation. Dov Fox has convincingly argued that “The FDA 
must step outside of the cost-benefit framework and reformu-
late its decision making” to accommodate “a more holistic 
. . . style of decision making governing biomedical enhance-
ment activity.”27 Fox argues that such decision making 
would necessitate ongoing monitoring of the use of enhanc-
ing drugs in order to ensure full understanding of their social 
effects. Fox also proposes that
Congress should amend the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act to give the FDA limited authority to regulate 
the practice of medicine [because] even where all uses 
of a given biomedical technology are equally safe 
and effective, some such uses are appropriate, while 
others are inappropriate, and can have serious social 
consequences.
Such authority would enable the agency to avoid the false 
dilemma of either flatly denying or approving given enhance-
ment technologies.
In an essay titled “The Ends of Economics,” Dupre and 
Gagnier comment on the remarkable fact that “most econo-
mists believe that the core of economics can be developed 
with no assumptions at all about what an economy should 
aim to provide.”28 Neurocosmeticians similarly presume 
to develop ideal emotional states for individuals while 
neglecting to aim to calibrate such responses to the particular 
phenomenon their “patients” will encounter. The resulting 
simulation of experience threatens to be as detached from 
reality as the “irrationally exuberant” financial models that 
led to the great financial market meltdown of 2008. Just like 
market participants who assume that housing prices can only 
go up, users of neurocosmetics who only seek the feeling of 
happiness and calm are blinding themselves to the darker 
realities of human nature and experience. Sadly, there are 
many middlemen and psychiatrists manques who can profit 
from such self-delusion.
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Notes
 1. See Berlin (1969). For a prescient critique of Berlin’s dichoto-
my, see Taylor (1985).
 2. See Pasquale (2006b, 2007). For a fuller discussion of how 
choices can be both “forced and free,” see Grewal (2008).
 3. The World Question Center (n.d.).
 4. See Pasquale (2007).
 5. See Greely et al. (2008).
 6. See Greely et al. (2008).
 7. See Angell (2009).
 8. See Henig (2007).
 9. See Kagan (2007).
10. See Portico (2007).
11. See Pasquale (2002).
12. See Bourne (1992).
13. See Lagnado (2007).
14. See O’Donnell (2007).
15. See Crews (2007).
16. See Conrad (2007), Horwitz and Wakefield (2007), Ian Jakobi 
(2007), and Lane (2007).
17. Compare Jennifer Chandler (2007) on court effectively requir-
ing injured person to undergo back surgery in order to “mitigate 
damages” before allowing damages claim to go forward.
18. See Ferris (2007).
19. See Horning (2009).
20. See Kompridis (2006).
21. See Pasquale (2006a).
22. See Wong (2009) and Friedman (2007).
23. See Borgmann (1984).
24. See Edwards (2000).
25. See, for example, Sunder (2001).
26. See Gibson (2008).
27. See Fox (2005).
28. See Dupre and Gagnier (1999).
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